Two holdings with very different fates. Charlton’s ruling that a DOTAS scheme reference number on a return engages the s29(5) bar is one of the few reliable taxpayer wins in discovery law. Its suggestion that a discovery goes stale with time was buried by the Supreme Court in Tooth. Cite the first; never the second.
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Full name: Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Charlton, Corfield and Corfield
Citation: [2012] UKUT 770 (TCC); [2013] STC 866
Court: Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber) (Warren J and Judge Berner)
Subject: Discovery assessments; the “quality of newness”; the hypothetical officer and DOTAS scheme reference numbers
Result: The taxpayers succeeded. The presence of a DOTAS scheme reference number on the returns meant the hypothetical officer could reasonably have been expected to be aware of the insufficiency, so s29(5) barred the assessments.
The Facts
The taxpayers participated in a marketed capital gains tax avoidance scheme which was subsequently found not to work. The arrangements fell within the disclosure of tax avoidance schemes rules in Part 7 of the Finance Act 2004.
The promoters accordingly notified HMRC of the scheme on form AAG1, and HMRC allocated it a scheme reference number. The promoters passed that number to the users, and the taxpayers entered it on their self-assessment returns in the box provided for the purpose, as the DOTAS rules require.
HMRC did not open enquiries into the returns within the s9A window. Once the window had closed, and once the scheme had been shown not to work, HMRC raised discovery assessments under s29 TMA 1970.
The Statutory Framework
Two provisions were in play:
- s29(1) TMA 1970: the requirement that an officer “discovers” an insufficiency. What does “discovery” require?
- s29(5) TMA 1970: the bar where, on the basis of the information made available before the enquiry window closed, an officer could reasonably have been expected to be aware of the insufficiency. The information pool is defined in s29(6), as explained in Langham v Veltema.
The Ratio Decidendi
(1) Discovery requires no new information. No new information, of fact or law, is needed for there to be a discovery. All that is required is that it has newly appeared to an officer, acting honestly and reasonably, that there is an insufficiency. The requirement of newness attaches to the officer’s conclusion, not to the reason for reaching it.
(2) A DOTAS scheme reference number engages s29(5). Where a return discloses a DOTAS scheme reference number, together with the associated entries, a hypothetical officer could reasonably be expected to be aware of the insufficiency. The assessments were accordingly barred.
Why the DOTAS holding matters
This is a rare instance of a taxpayer winning a s29(5) argument. The reasoning is compelling: HMRC designed the disclosure regime precisely so that it would know about avoidance arrangements. A taxpayer who complies with it has given HMRC exactly the notice the system was built to generate. Having received that notice, HMRC cannot say it could not reasonably have been expected to be aware of the insufficiency.
Contrast this with Veltema, where the taxpayer disclosed a valuation figure but nothing that alerted the officer to an insufficiency. A DOTAS number is different in kind: its entire function is to flag that the taxpayer is claiming a tax result HMRC is likely to dispute.
The standard of awareness
The Upper Tribunal also addressed how sure the hypothetical officer must be. The officer need not be aware of the insufficiency to the point of certainty; awareness that the assessment was insufficient, in the sense of being more likely than not, is enough. This is a taxpayer-friendly gloss on Veltema and remains good law.
The Staleness Passage: Obiter, and Now Disapproved
At paragraph [37] the Upper Tribunal said that a discovery must have “the quality of newness”, and went on to suggest in the latter part of that paragraph that a discovery could cease to be one through the passage of time, that it could go stale.
Practitioners built a substantial body of argument on that sentence between 2013 and 2021. It was applied and developed in Pattullo v HMRC [2016] STC 2043 and in a long line of FTT decisions.
The Supreme Court in Tooth held that there is “no place for the idea that a discovery which qualifies as such should cease to do so by the passage of time”, and expressly disapproved the latter part of paragraph [37] of Charlton. Because HMRC’s appeal in Tooth failed on the deliberate inaccuracy point, those remarks were strictly obiter, but in Harrison the Upper Tribunal held they were intended as binding general guidance and applied them.
The Line of Authority
- Cenlon Finance Co Ltd v Ellwood [1962] AC 782. The foundation. Discovery needs no new fact; what matters is that it newly appears to the officer that there has been an undercharge.
- Langham v Veltema [2004] EWCA Civ 193. The s29(5) test: the taxpayer must have clearly alerted the officer to the insufficiency.
- Sanderson v HMRC [2016] EWCA Civ 19. The Court of Appeal described the hypothetical officer as one of general competence, knowledge and skill, not expected to resolve difficult points of law, and confirmed that the taxpayer must have supplied information justifying the conclusion of an actual insufficiency.
- HMRC v Tooth [2021] UKSC 17. Discovery is subjective and officer-specific; there is no collective HMRC knowledge; staleness is not a concept known to the statute; and a return must be read as a whole.
Practitioner Application
Using the DOTAS holding
- Check whether a scheme reference number was entered. Where the client used a disclosed arrangement and reported the SRN on the return, Charlton gives a direct s29(5) argument. Retrieve the filed return and the AAG4 or equivalent.
- Establish what HMRC did with it. The SRN is fed into HMRC’s systems. Subject access and Freedom of Information requests can show when the return was risk-assessed and by whom.
- Fix the timing. The question is what was available before the enquiry window closed. Disclosure after that date does not assist.
- Do not overreach. The holding is about SRNs and the entries associated with them, not about avoidance generally. A scheme that fell outside DOTAS, or where the SRN was not reported, is back in Veltema territory.
Handling the staleness point
- Do not plead it. Delay alone no longer defeats a discovery assessment.
- Redirect the evidence. The timeline material gathered for a staleness argument is still valuable, for s29(5), for HMRC’s burden on careless or deliberate behaviour under s29(4), and where delay is genuinely egregious, for a public law challenge based on conspicuous unfairness.
- Watch for HMRC over-reading Tooth. The disapproval was confined to the temporal decay point. The rest of Charlton, including the standard of awareness and the DOTAS holding, stands.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is Charlton still good law?
In part. Its holding that a DOTAS scheme reference number on a return engages the s29(5) bar remains good law and is one of the strongest taxpayer arguments in this area. Its suggestion at paragraph [37] that a discovery could go stale through the passage of time was expressly disapproved by the Supreme Court in HMRC v Tooth [2021] UKSC 17 and applied as disapproved in Harrison v HMRC [2023] UKUT 38 (TCC).
Does reporting a DOTAS number protect me from a discovery assessment?
It gives you a strong s29(5) argument. Charlton holds that where a return discloses a scheme reference number and the associated entries, a hypothetical officer could reasonably be expected to be aware of the insufficiency, so HMRC cannot later say it could not have known. The protection depends on the SRN actually having been reported on the return before the enquiry window closed.
What does 'quality of newness' mean?
That the officer must have genuinely reached a new conclusion that there is an insufficiency. It does not require new information: Charlton is explicit that no new information, of fact or law, is needed. The newness attaches to the conclusion, not to the reason for it. That part of the decision survives Tooth; what does not survive is the further suggestion that the conclusion goes stale with time.
How certain does the hypothetical officer have to be?
Not certain. Charlton holds that awareness that the assessment was insufficient in the sense of being more likely than not is sufficient. This is a taxpayer-friendly gloss on Langham v Veltema and remains good law, only the staleness passage was disapproved.
Can I still argue delay against a discovery assessment?
Not as a free-standing staleness ground. But the same timeline evidence remains valuable for three other purposes: showing that s29(5) bars the assessment, testing HMRC’s burden on careless or deliberate behaviour under s29(4), and, where the delay is genuinely egregious, supporting a public law challenge based on conspicuous unfairness or abuse of power.