If HMRC could have chased your offshore employer for PAYE and didn't, does that mean you get credit as though it had been paid? The Court of Appeal's answer closed off one of the more resourceful arguments in disguised remuneration litigation.

Case at a glance.
Full name: Hoey and others v The Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs
Citation: [2022] EWCA Civ 656 (affirming Hoey v HMRC [2021] UKUT 82 (TCC))
Court: Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
Judgment: 13 May 2022
Subject: Disguised remuneration; contractor loan schemes; HMRC's discretion under s684(7A)(b) ITEPA 2003; PAYE regulations 80 and 81
Result: The taxpayer's appeal was dismissed. HMRC's discretion to assess the individual directly, without first exhausting PAYE recovery from the deemed employer, was upheld.

Why This Case Matters

Hoey is a significant procedural and substantive decision in the long-running disguised remuneration and contractor loan scheme litigation, addressing a question distinct from whether such schemes work at all, which had already been settled decisively against taxpayers by cases including HMRC v Murray Group Holdings (the Rangers FC case). Once it is established that a loan arrangement was, in substance, disguised remuneration, Hoey confirms how HMRC can go about collecting the resulting tax: directly from the individual contractor under its statutory discretion, without first having to pursue PAYE recovery from an offshore or otherwise elusive deemed employer. This closed off a PAYE credit argument that had real practical appeal to affected contractors.

The Facts

The taxpayer was a UK-based IT contractor who provided services to UK end users. His arrangements involved an offshore employer making contributions to an employee benefit trust, which in turn made loans to the taxpayer, a structure typical of the disguised remuneration and contractor loan schemes marketed over roughly two decades. HMRC assessed the taxpayer directly for income tax on the loan payments, treating them as disguised earnings, relying on its discretion under section 684(7A)(b) ITEPA 2003 to collect tax directly from the individual rather than pursuing PAYE recovery from the offshore employer through the regulation 80/81 machinery.

The structural point. The taxpayer's central argument was not that the loans were genuinely loans rather than earnings, that point had effectively already been lost across the wider body of disguised remuneration case law, but that HMRC's own statutory scheme required it to pursue PAYE recovery from the deemed employer where that was practically possible, and that having chosen not to do so, the taxpayer should receive credit as though PAYE had in fact been operated correctly by the employer.

Procedural History

  • First-tier Tribunal: found substantially for HMRC on the underlying disguised remuneration issues.
  • Upper Tribunal (Hoey v HMRC [2021] UKUT 82 (TCC), 12 April 2021): held the First-tier Tribunal had not erred in concluding it had no jurisdiction to determine entitlement to a PAYE credit once HMRC had exercised its discretion not to pursue the deemed employer, and that the transfer of assets abroad provisions were not separately engaged on the facts.
  • Court of Appeal (13 May 2022): dismissed the taxpayer's further appeal, upholding HMRC's discretion under s684(7A)(b) ITEPA 2003 to assess the individual directly.

The Issue

Whether HMRC's discretion under section 684(7A)(b) ITEPA 2003 to assess an individual directly for income tax on disguised remuneration payments is constrained by, or subordinate to, its separate powers under PAYE regulations 80 and 81 to pursue the deemed employer, such that a taxpayer is entitled to credit for PAYE that should have been operated by the employer wherever HMRC could, in principle, have exercised those regulation 80/81 powers instead of assessing the individual.

The Ratio Decidendi

What the Court of Appeal held. HMRC's discretion under section 684(7A)(b) ITEPA 2003 to assess an individual directly for income tax on disguised remuneration is a genuinely free-standing discretion, not one that is subordinate to, or conditional on HMRC first exhausting, its separate regulation 80/81 powers against the deemed employer. The taxpayer was not entitled to a PAYE credit merely because HMRC had a theoretical alternative route against the employer and chose not to pursue it. The First-tier Tribunal had correctly concluded it had no jurisdiction to second-guess HMRC's exercise of that discretion in the context of the taxpayer's own assessment.

The Court of Appeal's reasoning reflects a practical recognition that, in offshore disguised remuneration structures, pursuing the deemed employer under regulations 80 and 81 is frequently impractical or impossible, the employer may be dissolved, uncooperative, or outside the UK's effective enforcement reach, and that Parliament cannot have intended HMRC's ability to collect tax properly due from the individual recipient to depend on the practical availability of a parallel route against a potentially unreachable employer.

Regulations 80, 81 and Section 684(7A)(b)

The PAYE regime ordinarily places the primary obligation to deduct and account for income tax on the employer, with regulation 80 allowing HMRC to determine the amount an employer should have deducted, and regulation 81 allowing a direction transferring liability to the employee in limited circumstances. Section 684(7A)(b) ITEPA 2003 gives HMRC a separate, discretionary power to assess an individual directly for income tax where PAYE has not been operated correctly, without that power being expressly conditioned on the regulation 80/81 machinery having first been used or exhausted against the employer. Hoey confirms these are genuinely parallel, independent routes, and that HMRC's choice between them is not, at least on the facts of a case like this, open to challenge on the basis that the individual should benefit from a credit reflecting the route not taken.

Practitioner Application

  • Do not rely on a PAYE credit argument based solely on HMRC's theoretical ability to pursue the employer instead. Hoey confirms this argument does not succeed merely because regulation 80/81 recovery from the employer was, in principle, available.
  • Focus disguised remuneration defence work on the underlying characterisation and quantum issues, and on genuine procedural or time limit defences, rather than on HMRC's choice of collection route, which Hoey confirms is largely a matter for HMRC's discretion.
  • Where a client faces a direct assessment under s684(7A)(b), address the substantive disguised remuneration position and any reasonable excuse or time limit arguments, since the PAYE credit route Hoey addressed is now settled against taxpayers at Court of Appeal level.
  • Read Hoey alongside the wider disguised remuneration case law, including the Rangers FC line of authority on whether loan arrangements constitute disguised earnings in the first place, since the two lines of argument address genuinely separate questions.

Frequently Asked Questions

What did the Court of Appeal decide in Hoey v HMRC?

That HMRC's discretion to assess an individual directly for disguised remuneration under s684(7A)(b) ITEPA 2003 is not subordinate to its PAYE regulation 80/81 powers against the employer, and no PAYE credit was due.

Why did the taxpayer in Hoey argue for a PAYE credit?

Because HMRC could, in principle, have pursued the offshore deemed employer under regulations 80 and 81 instead of assessing him directly, and had not done so.

How does Hoey affect other disguised remuneration and contractor loan cases?

It closes off the PAYE credit argument across similar cases, confirming HMRC can assess individual contractors directly without first exhausting recovery from the employer.

Facing a disguised remuneration or contractor loan assessment?

The PAYE credit argument is settled, but genuine defences on quantum, characterisation and time limits often remain open.

LONDON: 020 3827 1447 DERBY: 01332 308655